United states and israel relationship with jordan

The Jekyll & Hyde Israel-Jordan Relationship - Arab-Israeli Conflict - Jerusalem Post

united states and israel relationship with jordan

Police suspect terrorism as Jordanian assaults 2 Israeli co-workers in Eilat The Jordan river can be seen in the Jordan valley area called Naharayim, or Baqura By refusing to renew peace deal annex allowing the Jewish state to lease 2. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Jordan's King Abdullah II that the monarch in a rare meeting after months of strained relations. any plan being floated by the Trump team, arguing that the United States has. The basis for implementation of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty was . Carol Migdalovitz, “Israel: Background and Relations with the United States,” DC.

In the two nations signed a trade treaty. As part of the agreement, Israel assisted in establishing a modern medical center in Amman. Jordan River Crossing —present Inwhen the government of Jordan sought permission from international governments to produce nuclear fuel for use in Jordanian power plantsIsrael objected, citing the unstable political nature of the Middle East.

In light of the Israeli objection the request for United States approval was denied. Economic relations Jordan has also benefited economically from the peace treaty. As a result of the treaty, Qualified Industrial Zones were developed in Jordan.

In these zones, companies that use a percentage of Israeli inputs can export duty-free to the United States.

U.S. - Israel Relations Explainer

As ofthe zones have generated 36, jobs, and have become the strongest engine for Jordan's economic growth. Jordanians are extremely unenthusiastic about doing business with Israeli companies. Further, Israeli companies mostly take on subcontracting work rather than invest directly into QIZs, with most direct investment coming from countries outside of the region. Foreign workers make up nearly half of the employees in the QIZs, and wages are very low: Supervisors at QIZs say they prefer to hire foreign workers because they are more committed and better trained and experienced in the manufacturing industry.

These workers are often trained in their home countries before coming to Jordan, whereas the cost of training Jordanian workers is said to be prohibitive.

Those opposing the QIZs blame low wages and bad working conditions for the reluctance of Jordanians to apply for jobs there. They argue that Jordanians have more societal obligations than foreign workers and often will not accept a lack of job security, wage freezes and extremely long hours. They cannot compete with foreign workers, who have fewer obligations and are willing to work overtime for low pay.

One bright spot for QIZs is their impact on the Jordanian women who work in QIZs, providing additional income to their households while being empowered to participate in public life. However, their jobs do not allow for significant salary increases or training to move up to higher-skilled positions, and working conditions are often poor.

Forty percent of this value comes through direct labor costs, the remaining 60 percent through processing costs of utilities, transport, medical insurance, government expenses, banking needs and other similar expenses.

This is true despite the fact that ground transport to Aqaba is cheaper than to Haifa. Beyond the processing costs, the linkages the QIZs have with the rest of the economy are limited. Jordan does not have the raw materials to contribute to the textile industry, and the percentage of required Israeli value-added drains the potential of local manufacturers to provide those materials.

Additionally, there is no local competition generated by the QIZs, because all of the products are exported directly to the United States. Labor costs in Jordan are still relatively high compared to other countries, including Egypt, which also has a QIZ agreement. Further, with the elimination of import quotas by the United States inthe QIZs lost their preferential status of quota-free access to the U.

Jordan could circumvent these effects by focusing on high-tariff products, over which it still has an advantage. QIZ manufacturers are also hoping that the 8 percent Israeli value-added requirement will be lowered in the future. Jordan has its own FTA with the United States, which aims to eliminate all trade barriers between the two countries by This FTA will have an impact on QIZs; there are differences between the agreements that could create both advantages and disadvantages.

united states and israel relationship with jordan

The number of Arab investors in QIZs has been low because of the lack of diplomatic relations between their countries and Israel. This could mean that more Arabs will invest in projects working through the FTA. This movement has brought together ideologically opposed parties, such as Islamists and leftists, to form an opposition to the peace treaty with Israel.

However, the Islamists have adopted a less religious tone, often using leftist arguments. The goal of the anti-normalization movement is to use civic organizations and professional associations to reduce the practical significance of the peace treaty.

united states and israel relationship with jordan

Each has its own council, and any Jordanian who wishes to practice in one of these professions must register with the respective association.

Professional associations are seen as the one true democratic outlet in Jordanian life since most Jordanians do not have faith in the parliamentary electoral system. The example most frequently cited by the opposition is the election, when the regime changed the election rules to ensure its allies would win and ratify the treaty with Israel.

In previous elections, the law designated a specific number of parliamentary seats for each electoral district and allowed voters to vote for the number of seats designated for their district. This was extremely beneficial to tribal leaders loyal to the regime; the IAF lost almost half of its seats.

The treaty was overwhelmingly ratified by parliament, but the opposition believes that the change in the election laws diminished the will of the people. In the associations, members choose their leaders democratically. Each has its own internal governance, and if someone practices a profession without registering with the association, the company that hires that individual can be penalized.

This has been interpreted to include attending an international conference with Israeli participants or even visiting Israel for personal reasons. Such individuals must appear before an internal-governance panel comprising three individuals with the power to expel offenders. This is an economic threat to those who cooperate with Israelis, as Jordanian law requires professionals to be members of their associations. This is probably an exaggeration; there are companies and individuals who work with Israelis, and there are jobs outside the network of the associations.

It is unlikely, however, that many people would risk their livelihood and social standing by supporting normalization. The anti-normalization committee used blacklisting against those engaging with Israelis. These blacklists were made available to neighboring Arab countries and even displayed on the screens of some satellite channels. The Jordanian government puts pressure on the associations for their anti-normalization positions.

Inthe government determined that the anti-normalization committee was illegal and declared null and void its decisions, both inside and outside the associations. The committee was originally disbanded but was later reformed with modifications. A compromise was reached: Many believe the reason most proposals for cooperation were not implemented was because of the anti-normalization movement.

The question arises as to whether association members do not cooperate with Israelis out of fear of repercussions from the associations.

U.S. Department of State

Association leaders argue that people do not want to cooperate with Israel and that even government officials are against the peace agreement. They say their rules are respected, not feared. There is merit to this argument, as a significant percentage of Jordanians resent Israeli actions and intentions in the region. However, the associations point to their successes, citing the Israeli trade fair in Jordan, when they mobilized a demonstration of 4, people.

Israel–Jordan relations - Wikipedia

The hotel had to close down. Visa Issues for Jordanians While Israelis easily obtain visas to enter Jordan, it is difficult for Jordanians to obtain visas to enter Israel. This has been a source of constant tension.

Whether Jordanians desire to visit Israel for tourism, business or family reasons, obtaining a visa is challenging. Israel says that it used to issue more visas to Jordanians, but thousands of Jordanians of Palestinian decent went to the West Bank and did not return.

Israel-Jordan Relations: Overview of Bilateral Cooperation

The Israeli viewpoint is not monolithic, even within the government. There is a strong difference of opinion between the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Interior, whose security apparatus gives clearances on visas. The Ministry of Interior relies on low-level employees, who ultimately have more of a say than ambassadors and embassy staff on the issuances of visas.

Other branches of the Israeli government, which deal with day-to-day visa issues, would like to see an increase in the number of visas issued to Jordanians. There is a VIP list for certain types of individuals, such as businessmen, but it has not solved many of the issues. For Jordanians, especially those of Palestinian origin, this issue creates significant tension, because many have families in Israel or the Occupied Territories whom they cannot visit. Jordanians and Israelis involved in bilateral cooperation believe that arguments about people going to the West Bank and not returning are illogical, since the Israeli embassy and Ministry of Interior know the reason an applicant is applying for a visa.

To them, it is not rational to delay or deny a visa application to those applying for business reasons or to attend events focusing on bilateral and regional cooperation. Tourism It was thought that cooperation on tourism would be an important aspect of the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, as the industry plays a significant role in both countries.

Besides the economic boost cooperation on tourism would provide, it was thought that the ease of access, especially for Israelis to Jordan, would increase people-to-people contact and create understanding. While there was some increase in tourism, the full potential of this opportunity was not reached. The problem for Jordanians has been obtaining a visa to visit Israel.

Because of this, many local businesses do not benefit, and Jordan raised entrance fees to its sites in order to cover maintenance costs.

InIsrael received about 11, Jordanian tourists, about. This number was significantly higher than the 2, tourists who came from Egypt in the same year, perhaps indicating that many of these Jordanians were of Palestinian origin visiting family in Israel or the Occupied Territories.

However, the number of Jordanian tourists in was dramatically lower than the 77, Jordanians who visited Israel inbefore the Second Intifada. When looking at the venues for arrival, one sees that Israel benefits. InIsrael received abouttourists from its crossings with Jordan, meaning that overnon-Jordanians visited Israel through Jordanian-Israeli crossings. In andJordan received betweenandIsraeli tourists, compared toin The majority stayed overnight. The only problem with looking at these statistics is the inability to determine how many of the Israeli visitors to Jordan were Arabs with Israeli citizenship.

Jordan also receives a significant number of arrivals through its crossing points with Israel; the Jordan Valley crossing in the north received overarrivals in Israelis say they enjoy traveling and point to the number of Israeli tourists who travel to Turkey, but they say their security must be guaranteed and because of this do not feel comfortable going to Jordan. At the early stages of the peace agreement, it was common to see Israelis in Jordan; today that is not the case.

In fact, some Israelis believe decreased Israeli tourism to Jordan is part of the reason for the decreased tourism at Petra. Jordanians rarely complete their university studies in Israel; they know it will be difficult to find work if employers see that their degrees were completed in Israel and because their degrees are not accepted by the professional associations.

Water Cooperation Water distribution is very important in a region with extreme scarcity. The Jordan River is a very highly contested water source. Its tributaries originate in Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the Golan Heights, with each country asserting rights over its water.

Cooperation on water-related matters has been one of the bright spots of the Jordanian-Israeli relationship and was made one of the top priorities in the peace negotiations. While many scholars have predicted water wars in the region, Jordan and Israel work well together on water issues. The crux of the water conflict between Israel and Jordan involved the right to utilize water from the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers. In the peace negotiations, Jordan put water utilization on the same level as security, territorial rights and the refugee problem.

This was the only dispute within the Arab-Israeli conflict not directly related to territory and thus gave rise to the opportunity to find a bilateral solution with a real negotiated settlement. The resolution of this conflict is an essential part of the treaty, which allocates fixed quotas of water to each party and stipulates future storing and diversion systems on the two rivers. Other provisions discuss cooperation on water pollution, distribution of groundwater resources, the prohibition of a unilateral change in flow of the two rivers, and finding future sources of water.

The treaty also allocates water from the other river to each country. Israel receives 25 million cubic meters mcm from the Yarmouk, and Jordan receives 30 mcm from the Jordan. Israel is also permitted to pump an additional 20 mcm of water during winter from the Yarmouk into the Sea of Galilee. This amount is redirected to Jordan during the summer months. This is a significant reduction from the amount of water it was using from the Yarmouk prior to the peace agreement.

However, Israel is permitted to maintain its usage of the previous levels of water from the Yarmouk until Jordan builds a dam on the river. Out of its 30 mcm allocation, 20 mcm comes from the river itself, while the rest comes from the Sea of Galilee until it can be provided by a desalination plant that processes groundwater sources.

The treaty also states that Israel and Jordan will work together to provide Jordan with an additional 50 mcm of fresh water in the future, but it does not specify how the costs for this would be distributed. Following the outbreak of Palestinian violence September in the territories, relations with Jordan cooled and Jordan recalled its ambassador.

Israel sent 14 ships, members of the water-pollution-unit in Eilatand workers of the Environment Ministry to participate. Inbilateral cooperation increased as officials met to discuss a variety of issues including cooperation in fighting the spread of bird flu. Jordan will receive the gas through a terminal that will be opened in mid Jordanian officials are skeptical about relying on foreign sources for so much of their oil needs; according to the chair of the Jordanian Senate Energy Committee "Jordan should focus on local resources.

We should never be dependent on external resources". Minister Silvan Shalom for Israel, H. Minister Shaddad Attilifor for the Palestinian Authority.

Within the MoU are three major regional water sharing initiatives that will support the management of scarce water resources in the region and contribute to the development and discovery of new water resources. The agreement includes plans for the construction of a pipeline connecting the Red Sea and the Dead Sea and an 80 million cubic meter sea water desalination plant in Aqaba on the Red Sea to provide water that will be shared between the three represented entities.

Israel will buy half of this desalinated water at cost, to be shared with the Palestinians, and the rest will be sent to Jordan. The Red Sea and the Dead Sea will be linked by a pipeline and water from the Red Sea will be pumped into the Dead Sea, because the Dead Sea has been found to be receding at a rate of one meter per year.

The agreement also provides for increased sales of water to Jordan from Israel's Like Tiberias and the Sea of Galilee, beyond the amount specified in the peace agreement.

All parties involved finalized the agreement on February 26,and in March it was announced that the pipeline should begin operating in The purpose of this meeting was to coordinate security measures at the holy site between the Jordainain Waqf Authority and the IDF. A few days after the meeting, Prime Minister Netanyahu called King Abdullah and assured him that the Jordanian special status at the Temple Mount will not change due to recent developments.

Both leaders called for an immediate cessation of late 's violence surrounding access to the Temple Mount. Following this meeting, US Secretary of State John Kerry met with the two leaders in Jordan and stated that everyone involved was interested in de-escalating the situation. In response to violence at the Temple Mount, Jordan recalled their ambassador from Israel on Wednesday November 5,for the first time since Jordan and Israel established diplomatic relations in The streets of Jordan filled with protestors on November 6 and 7, calling for the government to scrap its peace deal with the Israelis in light of the recent tensions surrounding the al-Aqsa Mosque.